

# SECURITY IN COMPUTING, FIFTH EDITION

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Chapter 5: Operating Systems

# Chapter 5 Objectives

- Basic security functions provided by operating systems
- System resources that require operating system protection
- Operating system design principles
- How operating systems control access to resources
- The history of trusted computing
- Characteristics of operating system rootkits


# History of Operating Systems

- Single-user systems, no OS
- Multiprogrammed OS, aka monitors
  - Multiple users
  - Multiple programs
  - Scheduling, sharing, concurrent use
- Personal computers


# Protected Objects

- Memory
- Sharable I/O devices, such as disks
- Serially reusable I/O devices, such as printers
- Sharable programs and subprocedures
- Networks
- Sharable data


# OS Layered Design



# Functions Spanning Layers



# Modular OS Design





# Virtualization


- With virtualization, the OS presents each user with just the resources that user should see
- The user has access to a virtual machine (VM), which contains those resources
- The user cannot access resources that are available to the OS but exist outside the VM
- A hypervisor, or VM monitor, is the software that implements a VM
  - Translates access requests between the VM and the OS
  - Can support multiple OSs in VMs simultaneously
- Honeypot: A VM meant to lure an attacker into an environment that can be both controlled and monitored




# Separation and Sharing

- Methods of separation:
  - Physical
  - Temporal
  - Logical
  - Cryptographic
- Methods of supporting separation/sharing:
  - Do not protect
  - Isolate
  - Share all or share nothing
  - Share but limit access
  - Limit use of an object


# Hardware Protection of Memory




# Fence Registers









# Base/Bounds Registers



# Two Pairs of Base/Bounds Registers




# Tagged Architecture

Tag	Memory Word
R	0001
RW	0137
R	0099
X	
X	
X	
X	
X	
X	
R	4091
RW	0002

Code: R = Read-only    RW = Read/Write  
 X = Execute-only




# Segment Address Translation






# Paging







# Paged Segmentation






# Principles of Secure OS Design

- Simplicity of design
  - OSs are inherently complex, and any unnecessary complexity only makes them harder to understand and secure
- Layered design
  - Enables layered trust
- Layered trust
  - Layering is both a way to keep a design logical and understandable and a way to limit risk
  - Example: very tight access controls on critical OS functions, fewer access controls on important noncritical functions, and few if any access controls on functions that aren't important to the OS

# Kernelized Design

- A kernel is the part of the OS that performs the lowest-level functions
  - Synchronization
  - Interprocess communication
  - Message passing
  - Interrupt handling
- A security kernel is responsible for enforcing the security mechanisms of the entire OS
  - Typically contained within the kernel

# Reference Monitor







# Trusted Systems

- A trusted system is one that has been shown to warrant some degree of trust that it will perform certain activities faithfully
- Characteristics of a trusted system:
  - A defined policy that details what security qualities it enforces
  - Appropriate measures and mechanisms by which it can enforce security adequately
  - Independent scrutiny or evaluation to ensure that the mechanisms have been selected and implemented properly

# History of Trusted Systems



# Trusted Computing Base (TCB)



# Other Trusted System Characteristics


- Secure startup
  - System startup is a tricky time for security, as most systems load basic I/O functionality before being able to load security functions
- Trusted path
  - An unforgeable connection by which the user can be confident of communicating directly with the OS
- Object reuse control
  - OS clears memory before reassigning it to ensure that leftover data doesn't become compromised
- Audit
  - Trusted systems track security-relevant changes, such as installation of new programs or OS modification
  - Audit logs must be protected against tampering and deletion



# Rootkits

- A rootkit is a malicious software package that attains and takes advantage of root status or effectively becomes part of the OS
- Rootkits often go to great length to avoid being discovered or, if discovered and partially removed, to reestablish themselves
  - This can include intercepting or modifying basic OS functions

# Rootkit Evading Detection





# Summary

- OSs have evolved from supporting single users and single programs to many users and programs at once
- Resources that require OS protection: memory, I/O devices, programs, and networks
- OSs use layered and modular designs for simplification and to separate critical functions from noncritical ones
- Resource access control can be enforced in a number of ways, including virtualization, segmentation, hardware memory protection, and reference monitors
- Rootkits are malicious software packages that attain root status or effectively become part of the OS