



Byzantine Generals Problem





Overview



- The Problem
- Two Solutions
- Oral Messages
- Signed Messages





The Problem




- Important to have reliable computer systems
- Two solutions to ensuring a reliable system
 - ❖ Having components that never fail
 - ❖ Ensure proper handling of cases where components fail
- Byzantine Generals Problem





The Problem



- Divisions of the Byzantine army camped outside the walls of an enemy city.
- Each division is led by a general.
- Generals decide on a common plan of action





The Problem

There are two types of generals

- Loyal Generals
- Traitor Generals

Problem – Conditions

Two conditions must be met:

- All loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action.
- A small number of traitors cannot cause the loyal generals to adopt a bad plan.





Problem – Not a Bad Plan




A plan that is not bad is defined in the following way:

- Each general sends his observation to all other generals.
- Let $v(i)$ be the message communicated by the i^{th} general.
- The combination of the $v(i)$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$ messages received determine a plan that is not bad.



Problem – Example Not a Bad Plan



- General 2 receives ATTACK, ATTACK.
- General 3 receives ATTACK, ATTACK.

So Not a Bad Plan is to ATTACK






Problem – Example Not a Bad Plan

- Assumed that every general communicates the same $v(i)$ to every other general.
- A traitor general can send different $v(i)$ messages to different generals.



Problem – Example Flaw



- General 2 receives ATTACK, ATTACK.
- General 3 receives RETREAT, ATTACK.

Is Not a Bad Plan to ATTACK or RETREAT?





Problem – New Conditions



The new conditions are:

- Any two loyal generals use the same value of $v(i)$.
- If the i^{th} general is loyal, then the value that he sends must be used by every loyal general as the value of $v(i)$.





Byzantine Generals Problem



- A commander general giving orders to his lieutenant generals.
- Byzantine Generals Problem – A commanding general must send an order to his $n-1$ lieutenant generals such that:
 - ❖ IC1. All loyal lieutenants obey the same order.
 - ❖ IC2. If the commanding general is loyal, then every loyal lieutenant obeys the order he sends.






Impossibility Results



When will the Byzantine Generals Problem fail?

The problem will fail if $1/3$ or more of the generals are traitors.

Impossibility Results – Example 1




L1 received the commands ATTACK, RETREAT

L1 doesn't know which general is a traitor.



Impossibility Results – Example 2



L1 again received the commands **ATTACK**, **RETREAT**

L1 doesn't know which general is a traitor.





Solution with Oral Messages




Assumptions:

A1: Every message that is sent is delivered correctly.

A2: The receiver of a message knows who sent it.

A3: The absence of a message can be detected.




$n=4$ generals; $m=1$ traitors

L2 calculates $\text{majority}(\text{ATTACK}, \text{ATTACK}, \text{RETREAT}) = \text{ATTACK}$



Solution with OM – Example



$n=4$ generals; $m=1$ traitors

L1, L2, L3 calculate majority(x, y, z)





Solution with Signed Messages



Simplify the problem by allowing generals to send unforgeable, signed messages

New assumption A4:

- a) A loyal general's signature cannot be forged, and any alteration of the contents of his signed messages can be detected.
- b) Anyone can verify the authenticity of a general's signature.





THANK YOU!!!

